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Abstract What should and what should not be for sale in a
society? This is the central question in the Moral Limits of
Markets (MLM) debate, which is conducted by a group of
business ethicists and liberal egalitarian political theorists.
These MLM theorists, which we will dub ‘market moral-
ists,’ all put forward a specific version of the argument that
while the market is well suited to allocate some categories
of goods and services, it is undesirable for the allocation of
other such categories. We argue that the current MLM
debate is too much framed in terms of a market/non-market
dichotomy. Moreover, authors tend to distinguish insuffi-
ciently between values such as freedom, equality, and
efficiency, and allocation methods such as the market, the
queue, and rationing. We introduce a new conceptual
scheme consisting of societal domains, values, and allo-
cation methods to provide a better structure for this debate.
The argument is illustrated from the education and
healthcare domains.
Keywords Allocation methods  Education  Healthcare 
Moral limits of markets  Sphere differentiation  Values
Introduction
The ‘expansionist tendency of the market’ (Buchanan
1985) has triggered a fierce debate on the ‘Moral Limits of
Markets’ (MLM). The central question here is whether we
should simply put up everything for sale, or whether there
are certain goods and services that should not be allocated
via the market. The most general characterization of the
MLM debate delineates two broad positions. On the one
hand are the market advocates who argue that the free
market is the best way for society to ‘allocate scarce goods
and necessary burdens’ (Elster 1992). There are two dif-
ferent reasons why market advocates believe this. They
typically point to (1) the importance of personal liberty and
the fact that letting people engage in voluntary exchanges
respects their freedom; and (2) the importance of the
general welfare, and the understanding that when two
people freely enter into a contract, both do so on the belief
that each is to gain, and thus, all other things being equal,
overall welfare is to be increased.
On the other hand are the market moralists. These
scholars do not accept the market as a means for solving all
problems of allocation and coordination in society. Market
moralists also have two core reasons for their position.
They typically argue that (1) many market choices are not
really free, as they are made against a background of
structural inequalities, and will result in an unjust distri-
bution of goods and services; and (2) certain goods and
social practices will be corrupted or degraded if bought and
sold on the market.
An example which may help bring out how these two
sets of argumentation play out is price gouging. Several
authors have recently argued about the moral permissibility
of price gouging and the impact on civic virtue it is likely
to have (e.g., Angel and McCabe 2009; Elegido 2015;
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Ferguson et al. 2011). In case of a natural disaster such as a
flood, the sudden and simultaneous effects of increased
demand and scarcity drive prices up which will deteriorate
the condition of the flood victims. The result is that water,
food, and shelter suddenly become unaffordable for people
who are already struggling to cope with the disaster.
Laissez-faire market advocates will typically defend such
practices because they reflect free choices. Even if exor-
bitant, the higher prices will give suppliers an incentive to
produce more of the needed goods. Therefore, the higher
prices serve a social purpose and will tend to do more good
than harm. The welfarists among the market advocates will
argue that even if high prices will prompt a greater supply
of goods, this benefit has to be weighed against the burden
such prices impose on society as a whole, including those
least able to afford them. On the other hand, the market
moralists will point to the fact that in the wake of a national
disaster buyers under duress have no freedom. In those
circumstances, people have no choice but to purchase
necessities like water and food and the exorbitant prices
look more like extortion. The argument from corruption
points out that even if price gouging stimulates entrepre-
neurial initiatives, excessive greed is a vice that a good
society should discourage. By outlawing price gouging, a
society affirms the civic virtue of shared sacrifice for the
common good.
In this paper, we want to focus on the market moralists,
who all argue for one reason or another that certain moral
limits should be set to the use of the market mechanism.
This argument has been made both by business ethicists,
such as Santos and Laczniak (2009) and Sison and Fon-
trodona (2010); by economists such as Hirsch (1976) and
Frey (1997); by legal scholars such as Ackerman and
Heinzerling (2004) and Radin (1996); and in particular also
by a group of political philosophers such as Anderson
(1993), Grant (2012), Sandel (2012), Satz (2010), Stein
(2001), and Walzer (1983). Some of these authors self-
identify as members of the group by employing the very
label MLM (Anderson, Sandel, and Satz); the others
qualify on the basis of a theoretical criterion, that is, they
all argue for some sort of divide between appropriate and
inappropriate instances of market-based allocation (Ack-
erman and Heinzerling, Frey, Grant, Hirsch, Radin, Santos
and Laczniak, Sison, Stein, and Walzer).
The main failure of the market moralists is that their
arguments often seem arbitrary—each category seems to
be argued for on a case-by-case basis, and there is no
systemic solution which could be worked up into a unified
theory of markets and morality. While some MLM theo-
rists display more clearly than others, the ambition to
develop a ‘more general theory for assessing markets’
(Satz 2010, 6), all market moralists can be seen to be
involved in such a project to a greater or lesser degree (cf.
Anderson 1993, 219–220; Radin 1996, 116–118; Sandel
2012, 11–15). But so far, each theorist is pursuing his or
her own project and no unified theory of markets and
morality seems to be in sight. We observe that after Walzer
(1983) and Anderson (1993) introduced and further
developed the idea of sphere differentiation, none of the
later market moralists distinguishes properly between
social domains, societal values, and allocation methods,
three elements in the new conceptual framework that we
introduce in this paper. Our paper therefore reconceptual-
izes the MLM debate by framing the issue of the market’s
proper scope in terms of these three constructs. We suggest
that in order to achieve a more thorough understanding of
the allocation of goods and services, the debate needs to be
conducted primarily in terms of values and domains, and
not merely in terms of allocation methods.
We first review the MLM literature. We then introduce
our new framework for analyzing the problem of MLM. To
that end, we look at the social domain construct as it was
originally introduced by Weber (1915), and was further
elaborated upon by Walzer (1983) and Anderson (1993).
Drawing on value theory (Rescher 1969; Schroeder 2013),
we then argue that separate social domains will be char-
acterized by their own configuration of values. Some of
these values will play a role in more than one social
domain, but each domain may be found to have its own
characteristic configuration of values. Building on earlier
work on allocative institutions, in particular by Calabresi
and Bobbitt (1978) and Elster (1992), we further argue that
particular allocation methods are incompatible with the
realization of particular individual values. After introduc-
ing our framework, we consider education and healthcare
as two sample domains from which the new conceptual
scheme can be illustrated.
Before proceeding, we make a brief clarification about
our scope and aim here. This article reviews and builds on
the MLM literature, but it does not itself seek to develop
and substantiate moral principles, as was done for example
by Sandel (2012), Satz (2010) and Walzer (1983). Our
overall goal in this paper is to provide methodological
reinforcement for the market moralists so as to generalize
the various strategies proposed by these authors.
The Moral Limits of Markets Debate
Origins
To reconstruct the MLM debate from its very beginnings,
we would need to go back to classical political economists
such as Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. These authors share a
number of ideas about the nature and limits of markets
which differ significantly from later ideas about the
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functioning of markets. First, classical political economists
were well aware of the social embeddedness of markets.
Second, they discerned that markets shape both individuals
and societies as much as individuals and societies shape
markets. For example, classical political economists
already saw that the way the labor market is organized in a
society will have an impact on the structure of public life in
that society and shape workers’ capacities and preferences
(Deane 1978).
But then, in the course of the 1870s, there was a rela-
tively sudden paradigm shift, fueled by the work of authors
such as Jevons (1871), Menger (1871), and Walras (1874).
Owing to their ‘marginal revolution,’ the focus of eco-
nomic analysis shifted to the question of how to optimize
consumer preferences. The neo-classical paradigm took
these preferences as given inputs so as to build a theory of
market price. This forms the background for a position in
modern economics, sometimes labeled ‘universal com-
modification’ (e.g., Radin 1996, 2–6). According to this
position, provided that certain basic conditions are fulfilled,
for example the prevention of theft and fraud, in principle
any good or service will be most efficiently distributed by
the market. In short, according to neo-classical economists,
all goods are economic goods. Among the economists who
have famously defended this extended use of the market
are Arrow (1973), Becker (1976), Friedman (1962), Hayek
(1960), and Posner (1977). For example, Becker did not
shy away from applying his economic analysis to explain
marriage and divorce (1976, 10, quoted in Sandel 2012,
50). Similarly, Posner concludes that ‘[r]ape bypasses the
market in sexual relations (marital or otherwise) … and
therefore should be forbidden’ (1977, quoted in Radin
1996, 86). It is against this idea of universal commodifi-
cation that market moralists typically lash out.
Parameters
In recent years, two central issues have emerged in the
MLM debate. Market advocates claim that—market failure
aside—the market will always provide the best distribution
of all goods and services. Second, they reason from the
(tacit) assumption that all goods and services can be
commodified without affecting them. These two stipula-
tions prompt two principal objections raised by MLM
theorists against the market advocates:
Objection 1: Markets may produce unjust results.
Objection 2: Markets can degrade the value of a good.
An early example of this second objection was the study
by the British sociologist Titmuss (Titmuss 1971) who
argued that a market in blood changes the social under-
standing of blood donation from a ‘gift of life’ to a mere
commodity. Indeed, by putting a price tag on all the good
things in life we arguably open the door to a perversion of
these goods. This happens in two ways. First, it may gen-
erate a type of self-contradiction. For example, friendship
cannot be bought; purchased companionship—as a member
of the leisure class may purchase the company of a valet or
a ‘social secretary’—is self-defeating, or at any rate it is
not the same as true friendship.1 Second, the market does
not only distribute goods but also expresses a certain
appreciation of those same goods. Economists typically
assume that markets will distribute goods in a neutral
fashion—that is, that the use of the market mechanism does
not affect the goods thus traded. But in many cases this is
not true. If we decide that certain goods can be bought and
sold, we claim that it is correct to view them as mer-
chandise. However, not all goods are can be valued
meaningfully in the open market, and this is why, for
instance, the buying and selling of people in slave markets
was abolished (Radin 1996, 156–159; Sandel 2012, 9–10).
For similar reasons you cannot buy or sell Nobel Prizes, or
the right to vote in a democracy. Nobel prizes are intended
to convey scientific accomplishment (Ibid., 94). Civil rights
and their correlative duties are not private property, but
public responsibilities. To outsource them would be to
degrade them (Anderson 1993, 158–159).
In order to complete a theory of MLM, market moralists
therefore must address two problems:
Problem 1: Which goods are suitable for market distri-
bution and which are not?
Problem 2: For those unsuited for the market, how they
ought to be allocated?
We believe the current market moralists have failed to
come to agreement on the former problem, and have failed
to adequately address the latter. Yet, these two questions
are critical. For anyone who accepts that the market has
benefits to offer, but that within the market instances of
distributive injustice likely exist (e.g., rich people having
better access to privatized medical care), and that instances
of goods being degraded likely exist (e.g., the purchasing
of university degrees), our two questions become most
salient.
The Market Moralists
The market moralists can trace their roots back to Walzer
(1983). In direct contrast to the neo-classical economists,
the core of Walzer’s argument was that all goods must be
considered social goods and that criteria for the distribution
of these goods should be derived from their social meaning.
On that basis he distinguished eleven distinct societal
1 However, see Chang (2001) for an argument in support of the idea
that friendship can be bought for money.
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‘spheres’ such as economics, politics, security and welfare,
and religion. Walzer argued that each sphere will be
characterized by its own standards of justice. Consider
these examples: public office is by definition public; the
goal of punishment is to either condemn particular acts,
deter others, or reform perpetrators; divine grace is a gift of
a gracious God. Thus, goods such as political office,
criminal justice, and divine grace by their very nature
ought not to be for sale (Walzer 1983).
Some have argued that Walzer’s actual division of spheres
is too ad hoc (e.g., Anderson 1993, 143; Ne´ron 2010, 338;
Radin 1996, 46–49; Satz 2010, 81). We will suggest in this
paper, however, that while the number and nature of the
spheres may be contestable, it does not negate the concept of
there being different domains of a society in which different
values may obtain. But it does seem that his argument
regarding the suitability of allowing money into the spheres
beyond the economic was too ad hoc. Too often his work
relies on uncritically evaluated social conventions. In what
sense does money ‘belong’ to the economic sphere such that
it is inappropriate, even immoral, for it to be used in other
spheres? And if Walzer holds that we should take into
account the social meaning of a good, this hardly helps us
allocate a good like public office. By itself, the idea of
spheres does not tell us how to distribute a particular good.
Two market moralists coming in the wake of Walzer,
Anderson and Radin, have therefore attempted to improve
on his conventional, and somewhat uncritical, notions of
what constitutes justice in the varying spheres of society.
Anderson’s work was occasioned by the increasing popu-
larity of ‘economistic political theories’ (1993, xii) starting
from Downs (1957). She objected to the hyper-rational
agent at the center of these theories, opposing such ‘a
socially impoverished conception of the individual’ (1993,
xii) and how it results in a far too simplistic view of the
process by which people come to their choices. These
economic theories of politics reduce human conduct to a
single mode of valuation, namely the instrumental use of a
good, ignoring the many other modes of valuation by
which people can actually respond to a good such as ‘love,
admiration, honor, respect, affection, and awe’ (Ibid., xiii).
By tracking differences in the ways we appropriately
value-specific goods, we can determine which goods are
properly treated as market commodities.
Anderson concludes that policy issues such as surrogate
motherhood, privatization of public services, and environ-
mental protection should not be viewed as tradable com-
modities, but as objects of respect or reverence. From these
particular instances she generalizes outwards, identifying
five features characteristic of market relations. Goods can
be appropriately distributed via the market if they are
impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-regarding, and ori-
ented to ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’ (1983, 145).
Radin (1996) seeks to develop a criterion for whether
markets are appropriate primarily based on Kantian respect
for persons. She argues there are some goods that are
‘identifiably self-constitutive’ (1996, 49) and important to
personhood and the flourishing of the individual. Examples
of such ‘internal’ goods (Ibid., 52) are a woman’s sexuality
and reproductive capacities. These goods should not be
distributed through the market, e.g., via prostitution and
paid surrogacy, because commodification is harmful to the
personhood of those involved (Ibid., 49–58).
Radin’s attempt to formulate a divide between appro-
priate and inappropriate uses of the market is complicated
by her introduction of the possibility of partial commodi-
fication. For example, in many farming communities chil-
dren may work alongside their parents in the fields at
harvest time. Ultimately, then, it is left unclear which
goods may be commodified, which may be partially com-
modified, which not commodified at all, and in the event of
the latter, how they ought to be allocated. The two prob-
lems of the market moralists thus go unanswered.
The author to have contributed most to actual theory
building on the problem of MLM was Satz (2010).2 She
identified four basic parameters for assessing markets.
Markets suffer from vulnerability if ‘some people are so
poor or so desperate that they accept any terms of exchange
that are offered’ (2010, 9). Markets have weak agency if
information asymmetries put some participants at a disad-
vantage and thus prevent them from looking out for their
welfare. Markets produce harmful outcomes for individuals
if they ‘become destitute or… their most basic interests are
undermined.’ And markets produce harmful outcomes for
society if they ‘undermine the framework for a society of
equals,’ or ‘support relations of humiliating subordination
or unaccountable power’ (2010, 9). If a market scores
poorly in regard to one or more of these criteria, she deems
it ‘noxious.’
Satz applies her criteria among others to the market for
kidney transplants. She observes that a noxious black
market for kidneys has arisen in poor countries. In such
countries, the extreme poverty of people makes them vul-
nerable, and their inadequate levels of education create the
information asymmetry that typifies weak agency. The sale
of kidneys often produces harmful outcomes for the indi-
viduals selling kidneys due to the lack of medical attention
they receive after the operation, and highlights the division
between the haves and have nots. Thus in poor countries,
the market for kidneys fails on all four criteria.
But even if Satz’s four criteria can do the heavy lifting
she has designed them to do, they would be insufficient
when it comes to the second problem of the market
2 For reviews of Satz (2010), see also Brown (2014), Claassen
(2012), and Maskivker (2009).
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moralists—how to distribute goods if they are unsuited for
the market?
The latest contribution to the MLM debate to date is
Sandel (2012).3 He notes the two principal objections of
the market moralists—first, that allocation via the market
may lead to injustice; and second, that markets will in some
cases corrupt the goods they allocate. In addition, Sandel
also makes three descriptive claims with respect to the
expansion of the market at the cost of other areas. He first
argues that the introduction of the market mechanism has
been so gradual as to have gone hardly noticed. He further
observes that precisely because the introduction of the
market mechanism was so gradual, there never was a
principled discussion about the propriety of this transition
from conventional norms to market norms, and thus he
calls for public debate. Third, he asserts that markets crowd
out non-market mechanisms. However, he gives no further
explanation how this happens.4 But he does not work out
any operationalized criteria that could help distinguish
between appropriate and inappropriate usage of markets.
The strength of Sandel’s work, therefore, may lie in
problem description rather than in problem solution. His
many colorful examples, though eclectic and unhelpful in
guiding his readers toward a solution, have served to re-
ignite the debate. They have convinced many that the
public debate he calls for—to question the appropriateness
of the market for the distribution of many goods—is indeed
badly needed.
In our paper, we seek to provide some insight into both
of the problems market moralists must address: What
goods are suitable for market distribution? And if not
suitable, by what alternative method ought they be dis-
tributed? In doing so, we will draw upon the concept of
domains that Walzer introduced and Anderson built on,
upon values that Anderson explicitly introduced to the
debate, and advocate the broadening of the debate beyond
academics to involve more directly the public as first
argued by Stein, and elaborated upon by Sandel. We will
add to the mix a discussion of allocative institutions,
broadening it beyond the simple dichotomy—market ver-
sus non-market allocation—that market moralists currently
focus on; provide a structure that relates domains, values,
and distributive methods to one another; and finally pro-
vide some focus to the public debate that needs to occur.
We will start our analysis by introducing the three basic
concepts of our new conceptual scheme.
Domains, Values, and Allocation Methods
The Domains of Society
Max Weber was among the first to view society as being
composed of different domains—such as the commercial,
the personal, the political, the romantic, and the spiritual
domains, in which different values may be argued to pre-
dominate. It was Weber’s contention that individuals bring
meaning to their lives by orienting themselves around one
single value, and that the values they choose from among
are potentially conflictual (Weber 1915). Weber’s con-
ceptualizing of the various social domains may, in turn,
have ultimately been related to the distinction between a
public and private sphere in ancient Greek philosophy. In
the world of the ancient Greeks, participation in politics
(the public sphere of the polis) assumed ownership of a
private household of women, servants, and slaves to do the
work. For Plato and Aristotle, it was natural that all citizens
had their own well-run private household, to provide for
their material needs, so that they could afford to devote
their attention to public matters. Hannah Arendt has shown
how this originally crisp and clear distinction was deci-
sively altered by the rise of ‘the social’ domain (1958,
38–50).
Following Weber, this approach was elaborated by the
German social psychologist Eduard Spranger (1928), who
outlined six domains, and later taken up by the market
moralists Walzer (1983)5 and Anderson (1993). Walzer’s
(1983) inquiry into a set of distinct ‘spheres of justice’ was
intended as a rejoinder to the Kantian universalism of
Rawls’ (1971) original project. The idea of a universal
theory of justice does not take sufficient account of the
different social spheres in which people interact. Walzer
believed that what constitutes justice in a particular case
will depend on the social sphere with which one is dealing,
and each has to be associated with its own criteria for
justice. Similarly, Anderson, claims that goods differ in
kind because they are valued according to different ‘modes
of evaluation’ that vary from one societal domain to
another. For example, goods with only a use value, such as
a hammer—desired solely because it helps us achieve
ends—belongs in the commercial domain. However, edu-
cation, which she argues has an intrinsic value in addition
to a use value, does not belong in the commercial domain
(1993, 199–201).
3 For reviews of Sandel (2012), see also Besley (2013), Brown
(2014), and Chandler (2014).
4 One potential explanation is that markets ‘don’t pass judgment on
preferences they satisfy. They don’t ask whether some ways of
valuing goods are higher, or worthier than others’ (2012, 14).
5 With the benefit of hindsight, there is a clear connection to be seen
between several of these authors anticipating the idea of domain
differentiation. But, interestingly, Walzer only mentions Weber in
regard to ‘patrimonial’ society and enforcement of religious holidays
(1983, 129, 193), while Anderson cites Weber only in regard to action
types and market ethics (1993, 22, 227); however, neither acknowl-
edges his work in regard to domains.
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The key point of the domain theorists is that they
advocate a pluralist view of society. They argue that each
domain contains different values, and the values are not
reducible to a single, all-encompassing one. Therefore,
they differ in approach, for example, from the utilitarians
who favor welfare or happiness as overriding values. The
number of values Anderson chooses to focus on, though, is
quite limited—she references only fraternity and demo-
cratic freedom (1993, 158–163). Walzer touches on a far
wider range of values, but limits his discussion of each to
particular domains. As examples, equal opportunity is
discussed only as it pertains to seeking office in the polit-
ical domain (and not for instance as it pertains to careers
outside that domain), and freedom shows up only in iso-
lated discussions regarding marriage, academics, and vot-
ing (1983, 131–132, 235–238, 284, 317–318); efficiency is
not discussed at all.
We believe the approach of these theorists, which begins
to link domains and values, is insightful and wish to pick
up where they left off. Our intention is to argue that the
different values will point to different allocative methods,
thus linking the allocative methods back to domains.
Table 1 systematizes the results of these four earlier ver-
sions of domain differentiation. As much as possible we
have used the authors’ original terminology, categorized
the distinctions made by the authors themselves, and ren-
dered them in alphabetical order.
For the purposes of this paper, we need not reconcile the
differences among the theorists, nor formulate an argument
regarding which list of domains is most correct, nor even
necessarily defend our interpretation of the scholars’ work
and the domains we associate with them. Here we only
wish to recognize that different domains have been dis-
tinguished within a society by at least four prominent
exponents of the idea of domain differentiation. We also
observe that none of these authors explicitly links their
discussion of domains to specific values or allocation
methods. We will now proceed to introduce these two
additional theoretical apparatuses.
Values and Allocation Methods Defined
and Illustrated
There is a rich and subtle philosophical literature on what
constitutes a value (e.g., Gaus 1990; Hsieh 2008; Nagel
1986; Parfit 2011; Putnam, 1981, 2002; Raz 1986, 1999;
Scanlon 1999; Sen 1988). For present purposes, we will
summarize this literature by defining values as reasons for
action, which guide people’s choices and enter into their
deliberations. In addition to this general philosophical lit-
erature, there is also a vast methodological literature on the
role of values in science and how value claims differ from
factual assessments (e.g., Douglas 2011; Hempel 1965;
Kuhn 1977; Nagel 1961; Weber 1949). Values moreover
vary according to the level of analysis one uses (Agle and
Caldwell 1999). They may be macro-level in nature, such
as cultural (Hofstede 1980; Kirkman et al. 2006); or micro-
level in nature, for instance at the personal level and
specific to managers (e.g., Bass and Bass 2008; Cressey
and Moore 1983). The values we are interested in are
meso-level in scope, and are the ones that have historically
been used as the basis for the distribution of goods and
services within societies. Examples of these societal values
include beauty, convenience, efficiency, equality, freedom,
loyalty, merit, need, truth, and welfare (e.g., Frederick and
Weber 1987; Martin 1981; Pearson and Chatterjee 2001;
Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1994, 1999).
As for the classification of different methods of alloca-
tion, the analysis in this paper goes back to the idea of
‘pure allocation approaches’ proposed by Calabresi and
Bobbitt (1978). Following Elster (1992), we will define
allocation methods here as the social institutions by which
Table 1 Various proposals for domain differentiation
Domain Weber (1915) (section #) Spranger (1928) Walzer (1983) (chapter #) Anderson (1993) (chapter #)
1. Aesthetic Aesthetic (6) Aesthetic Art (7.3)
2. Economic Economic (4) Economic Money & commodities (4) Market
3. Education & science Intellectual (8) Theoretical Education (8) Science (7.3)
4. Environment Environment (9)
5. Health Security and welfare (3) Surrogacy motherhood (8)
6. Leisure Free time (7) Clubs
7. Politics Political (5) Political Political power (12) State (7.5)
8. Professions Office (5), work (6) Professions (7.3)
9. Relationships Erotic (7) Social Kinship & love (9) Associations, family, friendship (7.4)
10. Spiritual Moral and religious (9) Religion Divine grace (10) Religion
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scarce goods and necessary burdens are allocated. In
Table 2, we include a partial list of allocative methods and
their associated societal values.
Our goal in presenting this table is not to produce an
exhaustive matrix of every value and allocation method,
but merely to give the reader a flavor of the interplay
between the two concepts. With that in mind, then, we will
consider the various entries in those cells. Efficiency is
conceived and operationalized in different ways. Econo-
mists usually think about efficiency in terms of optimizing
individual preference satisfaction, commonly known as
Pareto-optimality. From this perspective, a distribution is
efficient if nothing can be changed, without diminishing the
preference satisfaction of at least one other individual. In
his own writing, Pareto distinguished between ‘ophemal-
ity,’ referring to the satisfaction people get from economic
goods, and ‘utility’ which stands for a broader notion of
satisfaction derived not only from goods but from social
and political institutions as well. In addition to these two
traditional meanings of efficiency, some scholars still dis-
tinguish dynamic efficiency, which roughly coincides with
the innovation capacity of an economic system (Noote-
boom 2014). In this paper, we proceed from a more casual
idea of efficiency as maximal output for a given input. Vice
versa, the idea of realizing identical goals at lower costs—
thereby preventing waste—also carries the positive con-
notation people associate with efficiency (cf. Ackerman
and Heinzerling 2004; Stein 2001). This appraisive use of
the concept of efficiency is consistent with the definition
used by authors such as Heath (2001). The most common
allocation method used to promote efficiency in this sense
is the market. The free market does well at squeezing out
inefficient producers, because ceteris paribus rational
consumers will choose the lowest priced option. Thus,
those manufacturers with the more inefficient production
operations—that is, with costs higher than their competi-
tors—will be unable to get their selling price down low
enough to attract consumers (while still covering their
expenses), and will therefore go out of business. And also
in alternative interpretations of the market mechanism,
such as the evolutionary perspective suggested by Sugden
(1986), efficiency is naturally associated with markets.
Equality can be furthered by at least three allocation
methods: lotteries, rationing, and queuing. The queue is
likely to be used to allocate a somewhat scarce, but not
critical good or service, such as a cashiers’ time and attention
at supermarket check-outs. Lotteries and rationing are used
for more critical goods. A lottery guarantees an equal prob-
ability of obtaining a good that exists in discrete non-divisible
units, such as kidneys (Waring 2004), while rationing guar-
antees an equal outcome (i.e., allocation) for a good that
exists in bulk such as flour (Cornes and Sandler 1996).
The societal value of freedom is commonly interpreted
in terms of either or both of two major forms, designated
with the labels negative and positive (Berlin 1969).
Negative freedom entails no physical interference from
others and laws primarily being put in place to prevent such
interference. One allocation method for promoting negative
freedom is the free market, because broadly characterized,
in a setting free from physical interference, getting those
goods and services one wants depends on one’s ability to
offer up something of value—tangibles such as product or
money, or intangibles such as one’s labor. Both buyers and
sellers choose their best offer, and the interplay of demand
and supply sets prices free of the undue bias of any indi-
vidual or group policy. This setting of maximal negative
freedom is, of course, the libertarian conception of the free
market (Nozick 1974). Positive freedom, on the other hand,
may roughly be operationalized as self-realization. It refers
to the possibility of developing one’s talents and capabil-
ities (Sen 2009), and enabling others to realize the potential
they have in them. In its positive meaning, freedom will be
realized by attributional assessment, where an individual is
allocated a good based on the presence or quantity of some
personal characteristic (Wempe 2004). In the context of
positive freedom, parents may seek to enable their children,
by looking at talents and qualities they appear to possess,
and then trying to develop those.
Table 2 Societal values and
allocation methods
Allocation methods
Attributional assessment Free market Lottery Queue Rationing
Values
Efficiency 4
Equality 4 4 4
Freedom 4
Merit 4
Need 4 4
Status 4 4
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Merit is most likely promoted by an attributional
assessment—a performance review evaluating a person’s
previous accomplishments. For instance, a key attribute in
determining access to grant funding, in the case of uni-
versity professors, may be the number of publications in
top-tier journals. Key attributes considered for access to the
best graduate educational programs, in the case of uni-
versity students, may be the quality of their undergraduate
program, their grade point average, and the stature of the
people writing their recommendation letters.
The fifth value, need, may also be promoted by means of
attributional assessment. Triage, where people are assessed
in terms of a particular attribute—the urgency of their
medical condition—determines access to the services of a
hospital emergency room. At other times attributional
assessment may require a formal appraisal of a demo-
graphic variable. For instance, the attribute evaluated for
access to an elementary school free lunch program would
be parental income (Levine 2008). For scarce goods that
are considered essential to everyone’s survival, need may
also be advanced by rationing. In 1940, for example,
rationing was used to meet people’s needs for basic caloric
intake in England during the Second World War, when it
was estimated the nation only had food stocks sufficient to
last 6 weeks (Elster 1992). Therefore, as a societal value,
need (relief) is advanced by at least two allocation meth-
ods—attribution and rationing.
By status we mean wealth, and to a much lesser degree
pedigree. Leading the privileged life, something so many
people aspire toward, traditionally required the possession
of a particular attribute—specifically, pedigree. Admission
into some social or country clubs is still at least partly
based on the presence of one’s last name in some social
registry, and one’s ability to demonstrate appropriate lin-
eage to that name (Domhoff 1974; Higley 1995; Sherwood
2012; Veblen 1899). However, in America, along with
some other parts of the world, the life of status is also
promoted through the free market. In the marketplace, one
purchases the goods and services of elite schools and
resorts, and access into exclusive gated communities and
nightclubs. Thus similar to equality and need, we see status
as a value being realized by at least two allocation meth-
ods—in this case attribution and the free market.
The Interplay of Domains, Values, and Allocation
Methods
In this section, we examine the relationships between the
three variables of our conceptual framework. Values form
the backbone of this framework, and so we will discuss
values and their relationship to allocation methods, and
then discuss values and their relationship to domains.
Values and Allocation Methods
We note again here that Table 2 is not meant to be an
exhaustive survey of societal values and allocative meth-
ods. Rather, it is designed to make evident the following
observations regarding the relationship between values and
allocation methods. At least three obvious results can be
seen:
(1) Allocation methods support some values, but not
others. A lottery, for example, is commonly taken as
an allocation method that supports equality—it is
used to assure everyone having an equal probability
of obtaining an outcome. It would be hard to imagine
lotteries as an allocation method that would promote
a value like merit.
(2) Allocation methods can support more than one
value. For example, attributional assessments may
be used to support merit, and need, as well as status.
It will support merit as in the case of a performance
review where a granting agency may review a
scholar’s CV in search of a particular attribute, such
as publications in top-tier journals. It will support
need, as in the triage performed at the emergency
rooms where hospital staff seek to identify a
particular attribute of an individual—the urgency
of their medical condition. Or it may support status,
as in a background check completed by an exclusive
country club in search of a particular attribute, such
as ‘proper’ lineage. Thus, attributional assess-
ments—be they in the form of performance reviews,
triage, or background legacy checks—may be used
in order to promote multiple values. As to the market
mechanism, it is widely acknowledged that markets
will support efficiency (e.g., Buchanan 1985, 14;
Okun 1975, 50–51; Satz 2010, 17–21), freedom
(e.g., Buchanan 1985, 78; Nozick 1974; Satz 2010,
21–26), and status (e.g., Buchanan 1985, 81-87;
Sandel 2012, 172, 201).
(3) Values can be supported by more than one
allocation method. For instance, the value ‘equality’
can be promoted by lotteries, rationing, or queues
(Fleurbaey 2007, 2008). Similarly, need can be
promoted with at least two different allocative
methods—attributional assessment (Daniels 1985,
26–28) and in some cases rationing (Daniels 1985,
14–15).
Values and Domains
We can make some similar observations regarding the
number of values and number of domains and how they
correspond to one another.
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(1) Some domains have more than one value. Some-
times these values co-exist on an equal footing,
sometimes one has priority over the others. Health-
care, for example, has at least two values associated
with it. As was shown by Daniels, need typically acts
as the dominant value, and equality as a subordinate
value. Daniels (2013) specifies two main ‘concep-
tualization[s] of equitable access to healthcare
among health service researchers,’ that is, ‘the use-
per-need view’ and ‘the modified market view.’ The
use-per-need view is supported by scholars such as
Aday (1975, 2001); Aday and Anderson
(1974, 1975); and Aday et al. (1980) and proceeds
from ‘the idea that the utilization of services should
reflect actual needs for care.’ The modified market
view, which is among others expounded by Entho-
ven (1980), ‘focuses on the availability in the market
of a decent basic minimum of care’ (all healthcare
sources quoted in Daniels 2013). Both these main
conceptions build on the idea of healthcare needs as
a basis for a theory of the just distribution of
healthcare services.
Daniels (1985) concludes ‘we must talk about
healthcare needs if we are to explain what is special
about healthcare and thus be in a position to give an
account of distributive justice for it’ (1985, 23,
emphasis in original). But because the concept of
needs has been ‘in philosophical disrepute,’ being
‘both too weak and too strong to get us very far
toward a theory of distributive justice,’ it must be
combined with some notion of ‘fair equal access.’
On the one hand, the concept of needs is ‘oppor-
tunistic’ in that we tend to refer to the means nec-
essary to reach any of our goals as ‘needs.’ On the
other hand, the idea of ‘needs’ distinguishes insuf-
ficiently between what is basic and what is not-basic.
The prominence of need and equality as a subordi-
nate value in the healthcare domain can also be seen
from the familiar practice of triage (Sirgy et al.
2011). For example, in the waiting area of an
emergency room, specially trained nurses will
quickly examine patients, and sort them into rough
groups. The group with the most acute and life-
threatening conditions will then receive the first
attention. In any given group, patients will be viewed
as equals and the order of arrival to the emergency
room is most likely used to determine who gets the
first attention. Thus, triage is used to divide people
into groups, and to establish priority between groups,
and then queuing is used to establish priority within
groups.
(2) Some values exist in more than one domain. Need-
based allocation plays a role in both the healthcare
domain and the education domain. The former—
involving triage—has already been discussed.
Regarding a similar combination of need and
equality6 in the educational domain Walzer points
out that ‘educational equality [can be seen] as a form
of welfare provision, where all children, conceived
as future citizens, have the same need to know, and
where the ideal of membership is best served if they
are all taught the same things’ (1983, 203). Need has
also been used to justify the allocation of hot lunches
at elementary schools, as well as need-based schol-
arships to students and subsidies to schools (e.g.,
Feinberg 1998; McPherson and Schapiro 1998;
Newman et al. 2010; Posselt 2009).
Illustration from Two Sample Domains
Having outlined the relationship between domains, values,
and allocation methods, we can now translate the MLM
debate into terms of the conceptual scheme developed here.
In order to focus our discussion and to help make it a more
concrete, we apply our conceptual framework once again to
the two sample domains of healthcare and education and
some relevant issues pertaining to them. We believe that
focusing the discussion on values will make it clear which
allocation methods are permissible for use in a domain, and
this should thus help make clear why certain actions would
be inappropriate.
Healthcare
In regard to the healthcare domain, one example prominent
in the debate is the sale of body organs, specifically kid-
neys.7 In most countries, people may donate their kidneys,
but not sell them on the open market. But some disagree
with this regime, and argue for a free market for kidneys
(e.g., Cherry 2005; Hippen 2005; Taylor 2005). On the one
hand, the argument is that thousands of people die each
year waiting for kidney transplants. On the other hand,
people in need of money should be free to sell their kidneys
if they wish.
The core argument for permitting the buying and selling
of kidneys rests on the libertarian notion of self-ownership,
that is, if I own my body, I should also be free to sell my
6 The particular configuration of need as a dominant value and
equality as a subordinate value constitutes an important parallel
between the healthcare and education domains. ‘Both address needs
which are not equally distributed among individuals’ (Daniels 1985,
46, emphasis in original).
7 This and the following paragraph build on Sandel (2010, 70–72).
Parallel arguments are made by other market moralists, e.g., Radin
(1996, 8, 21, 23–24, 48, 51, 124) and Satz (2010, 189–205).
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body parts as I please. But most proponents of markets in
kidneys stop short of embracing the full libertarian logic, as
Sandel (2010) shows on the basis of two thought experi-
ments that isolate the pure element of self-ownership. The
first case is an eccentric art dealer who sells human organs
to affluent clients as coffee table conversation pieces. The
second case concerns a subsistence farmer in an Indian
village who has already before sold his first kidney in order
to raise money to educate his first child. When his second
child approaches college age, and another buyer offers a
handsome price for his second kidney, should he be free to
sell his second kidney too, even if that would kill him?
Sandel concludes that ‘[i]f the moral case for organ sales
rests on the notion of self-ownership, the answer must be
yes. It would be odd to think that the farmer owns one of
his kidneys but not the other…. if we own our bodies and
lives, then the farmer has every right to sell his second
kidney, even if this amounts to selling his life’ (2010, 72).
If all this constitutes an adequate assessment of the
values appropriate to the healthcare domain, the implica-
tion of applying our new conceptual scheme would be that
the sale of body organs in the market will lead to an
allocation not in accordance with the values of that domain.
The neediest may not receive the organs; rather we would
expect the privileged to. If need and equality are to persist
as values in healthcare, then an attributional assessment
must be performed to determine who is in most need of a
kidney, with perhaps a lottery used to determine who is to
be served first among those of equal need. Other subordi-
nate values may come into play, for example, some sense
of effectiveness may be important—if a patient is too close
to death, transplanting a kidney may be ineffective. The
point here is that certain allocation methods (attributional
assessment, lottery) become appropriate given the values in
play, and other allocation methods become inappropriate
(market, queuing).
As far as business participation is concerned, in what
can clearly be a very complicated public policy-making
process, companies would need to focus more directly on
values appropriate to a societal domain, independent of
their traditional claim to enhancing efficiency. In the
domain of healthcare, it would mean that while there is
nothing wrong with trying to make processes more effi-
cient, this should not be achieved at the cost of the primary
values of the healthcare field, such as satisfying the needs
of the patients (c.f., Stein 2001; Weber 2001). Similarly,
various approaches taken by businesses for underwriting
costs in the healthcare field need to be brought under the
lens. For example, consider concerns that exist regarding
the role that pharmaceutical company representatives play
in the provisioning of drugs to the medical field. Pharma-
ceutical companies heavily subsidize many conferences for
doctors (Relman 2001; Rodwin 2013), and in so doing have
access to the doctors and more importantly may create a
sense of indebtedness—such that doctors feel obliged,
almost unconsciously, to prefer the drugs of the pharma-
ceuticals providing them with perquisites (Sah and Fugh-
Berman 2013; Vashi and Lakowski 2012). Such commer-
cial sponsorship in healthcare should not be judged
exclusively in terms of the financial assistance it provides,
but rather with a view to how well such efforts go together
with the primary aims of healthcare. Administrators in the
healthcare domain, while they are under pressure from
diminishing funding by governments or insurance provi-
ders, would do well to take account of how this may cor-
rupt the values associated with their domain.
Education
In regard to the education domain, consider developmental
admissions. While many readers are familiar with legacy
admissions (giving an edge in admissions to the children of
alumni), less familiar to readers and probably more insid-
ious are ‘development admits.’ At many universities, there
are ‘applicants who are not children of alumni but who
have wealthy parents able to make a sizable financial
contribution to the school. Many universities admit such
students even if their grades and test scores are not as high
as would otherwise be required’ (Sandel 2010, 182).
However, in the educational domain merit has long been a
cornerstone value. Attributional assessment is a provision
mechanism that can promote this value, while the market
cannot. Developmental admissions will produce a skewed
allocation of admissions—favoring the privileged class—
giving some groups in society an unjust advantage. Addi-
tionally, these kinds of admissions will have a corrupting
influence on the educational good itself. Opening the door
to making education a purchasable commodity corrupts it,
because a degree no longer represents knowledge acquired
solely through merit, but makes it instead a credential
partially purchased with one’s wealth. Therefore, assuming
merit is to remain as a central value in education, pur-
chasing admission is inappropriate, and must not be
engaged in, even if it provides funds for the university.
It follows, then, that the call for a public debate made by
various MLM scholars (Sandel 2012; Satz 2010; Stein
2001) must be conducted in regard to values such as effi-
ciency, freedom, and equality, rather than in regard to al-
locative methods such as the market or the queue. Do
people value efficiency or freedom so much that they are
willing to bring the market mechanism into other domains
and run the risk of it subordinating the pre-existing values
(such as need, equality, and merit) of those domains? Or
consider a variation of this question in the context of
education, where equality emerged as a key value in
America after the Second World War (Ehrenberg 2006).
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Starting in the 1950s, numerous educational programs
assuring equality in education were developed. For exam-
ple, remedial instruction for the needy, or special education
for the differently abled, has been implemented at great
cost to the members of society. However, if we are now
less willing to fund such costly programs, such that
administrators feel obliged to introduce aspects of the
market mechanism into their school—say through devel-
opmental admits—the administrators will necessarily open
the door to privilege, thus putting at risk the very value
(equality) they were trying to promote. Those responsible
for administering a domain—in this case educational
administrators—thus struggle to manage the mixed mes-
sage society sends them (‘‘Yes, equality is important and so
you must provide special educational programs, but no, we
are unwilling to fund them to the necessary extent.’’)
Perhaps, then, it is time to bring the point to the public
forum for a debate: Is equality to remain a value in the
educational domain or not? (And for the answer to be truly
‘‘yes,’’ then the funding must be there to support it.) In
other words, debate is needed and it must be more about
values than allocative methods. Within the broad public
forum of our society, we need to decide which values are
important to a domain, and then having done so it should
be more apparent which allocative methods should or
should not be used in that domain.
Such debates regarding the values appropriate to a
domain may need to be reopened periodically—since
societies are dynamic in nature—and thus it should be
understood by all that questions regarding values will never
actually be permanently settled. Additionally, it should be
clear that value changes and resulting changes in the use of
mechanisms will often be controversial, though not nec-
essarily so. One example of this is England during WWII.
Originally, gas was allocated via the free market, for as
with many commodities, negative freedom is often an
important value—that is, a prevailing view in Western
society is that people should be free to trade as they please,
unless it interferes with other people’s ability to do so.
However, upon the outbreak of war, supplies from the
Persian Gulf were threatened, and simultaneously the
British government began stockpiling fuel. A shortage
occurred, and in the name of equity, the Government began
to ration petrol, trying to make sure everyone had access to
the fuel they needed, even if in reduced amounts. The
Government’s decision to adopt a new value (equity) and
distribution mechanism (rationing) proved highly contro-
versial, as Britain’s survival was not yet in question. Once
the Battle of Britain began, though, the sale of petrol was
prohibited. It could be used freely for those efforts deemed
critical to Britain’s survival, such as for running farm
machinery; otherwise its use was forbidden. It was free,
because having to pay for it would have put users out of
business—it was so valuable. In other words, it had
become literally priceless (Zweiniger-Bargielowska
2000)—not just invaluable but actually un-valuable. This
time the Government’s decision to adopt a new value
(need) and distribution mechanism (honor system) was
non-controversial—the public patriotically accepted this
decision.
Lastly, this discussion raises the question of why the
market is intruding into these other spheres in the first
place, as market moralists claim (Anderson 1993, 141;
Radin 1996, 95–101; Sandel 2012, 6–8, 93–130; Satz 2010,
3; Walzer 1983, 120–122). The domains of healthcare and
education are both dealing with escalating costs (Daniels
1985; Newman et al. 2010; Nooteboom 2014). The mar-
ket’s pricing mechanism is quite effective at squeezing out
inefficient suppliers and pushing prices down, thus helping
to make costs more manageable. Thus, in the case of
education and healthcare, there are cost concerns and a
desire to bring expenses under control, and this most likely
accounts for the choice to introduce the market mechanism
into these domains.
The tacit assumption that administrators in education
and healthcare must be making is that the principal values
of their domains can still be achieved, but more cheaply
and more readily (and thus more efficiently) via the market
mechanism. The reality, though, is that if society values
need as a basis for administering healthcare and merit as a
basis for administering education (for example), the market
may be ill-suited as an allocation method for either of those
domains, since it promotes values other than need and
merit.
Conclusion
Implications for Theory
This paper builds on and seeks to extend the work of a
group of theorists we have labeled market moralists, all of
whom seek a solution to the MLM problem, that is, where
to draw a line between goods and services that can
appropriately be allocated by the market, and goods and
services that are unsuited for market allocation. Current
market moralists have put forward various proposals, but
they can be shown to suffer from the following short-
comings. (1) All market moralists discussed here tend to
conceptualize the MLM problem as a simple dichotomy of
market vs. non-market allocation; (2) some tend to look too
much for universal criteria for the distinction of particular
‘noxious’ markets or incentive systems (Grant, Sandel, and
Satz); or (3) stage their arguments for particular ‘fungible’
goods on a case-by-case basis (Anderson, Radin, Sandel,
Stein, and Walzer); (4) finally, all market moralists
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discussed fail to address the logical follow-up question: if
goods are unsuited for the market, how should they be
allocated?
This paper has sought to address these weaknesses. In
our proposal, the problem statement for the MLM debate
needs to be refined and sharpened by distinguishing dif-
ferent social domains. Accordingly, we re-introduce to the
debate the concept of domain differentiation as already
proposed by Walzer (1983) and Anderson (1993). How-
ever, we couple the distinction of social domains to values
and allocation methods. We suggest that a characteristic
(set of) value(s) can be associated with each separate
domain, and in turn every value will be supported by an
accompanying (set of) allocative method(s). While our
configuration of values and allocation methods in Table 2
certainly is not intended as a complete and definitive
typology, the table suffices to give a flavor of their inter-
play. Furthermore, it helps explain why an allocation
method such as the market is ill-suited for certain domains.
The market may promote values that are foreign to some
domains; for example, the market benefits the privileged,
and status is a value that is out of place in the healthcare
domain. Our three-part conceptualization of domains, val-
ues, and allocation methods forms the foundation for a
possible moral theory of markets; markets ought not be
used as an allocative method where any of the values it
necessarily promotes (e.g., negative freedom, efficiency,
status) are not values of the domain in question. The three-
part conceptualization should further be able to identify
which allocation methods are permissible in a particular
domain. A value such as equality in a domain may make
permissible the use of rationing, for example assuming the
good or service is divisible, provided rationing does not
undermine another value in that domain. Thus, the theo-
retical contribution of this paper for the MLM debate may
be summarized in terms of three propositions:
1. The discussion on the moral limits of markets cannot
be conducted in categorical terms, but needs to dif-
ferentiate between social domains.
2. Each of these social domains may be found to have its
own values.
3. Different values will be realized by different alloca-
tion methods.
Only with these three propositions in mind will it be
possible to have a productive debate on the use of the
market, or for that matter any allocation method, in a given
part of our society today.
Implications for Research
This paper has only sought to indicate where the current
market moralists go wrong and how their argument
conceivably could be conducted in the future. The gener-
alization of earlier proposals for domain differentiation
(summarized in Table 1) was merely intended as a com-
parison of the four earlier domain theorists we reviewed
and still needs to be refined and elaborated. In theorizing
the idea of social domains, we should include in particular
the political science and policy analysis literature (Dahl
and Lindblom 1976; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Musgrave
and Musgrave 1984; Weimer and Vining 1992; Wildavsky
1979) as well as the typology of institutional orders elab-
orated in the institutional logics perspective (Thornton
et al. 2012). Together with the example of the configuration
of societal values and allocative methods in Table 2, this
could be the source of a major empirical research effort
designed to test further examples both in healthcare and
education and beyond these two sample domains exem-
plified in this paper. For example, managers in both the
leisure domain (which according to some domain theorists
could include the entertainment industry and sports) and
the environmental domain face questions regarding the
appropriateness of the market to those domains. To decide
what should and what should not be for sale for money,
then, we will need to determine which values in the dif-
ferent social domains we want to respect. In this regard,
recent market moralists have done important work, but we
need to go about these matters more systematically and
methodologically than has been done so far. Another topic
for future research along the lines sketched here is related
to the fact that debates involving values will likely involve
the problem of the essential contestability of value-con-
cepts (Gallie 1956), a discussion with a long pedigree (e.g.,
Collier et al. 2006; Connolly 1983; Gaus 2000; Gray 1977;
Swanton 1992), which is still ongoing.
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